Unsolicited BFD for Sessionless Applications

The current implementation and deployment practice for BFD ( and ) usually requires BFD sessions be explicitly configured or registered on both sides. This requirement is not an issue when an application like BGP has the concept of a "session" that involves both sides for its establishment. However, this requirement can be operationally challenging when the prerequisite "session" does not naturally exist between two endpoints in an application. Simultaneous configuration and coordination may be required on both sides for BFD to take effect. For example: When BFD is used to keep track of the "liveness" of the nexthop of static routes. Although only one side may need the BFD functionality, currently both sides need to be involved in specific configuration and coordination and in some cases static routes are created unnecessarily just for BFD. When BFD is used to keep track of the "liveness" of the third-pary nexthop of BGP routes received from the Route Server at an Internet Exchange Point (IXP). As the third-party nexthop is different from the peering address of the Route Server, for BFD to work, currently two routers peering with the Route Server need to have routes and nexthops from each other (although indirectly via the Router Server), and the nexthop of each router must be present at the same time. These issues are also discussed in . Clearly it is beneficial and desirable to reduce or eliminate unnecessary configurations and coordination in these "sessionless" applications using BFD. In this document we present procedures for "unsolicited BFD" that allow a BFD session to be initiated by only one side, and be established without explicit per-session configuration or registration by the other side (subject to certain per-interface or per-router policies). With "unsolicited BFD" there is potential risk for excessive resource usage by BFD from "unexpected" remote systems. To mitigate such risks, several mechanisms are recommended in the Security Considerations section. Compared to the "Seamless BFD" , this proposal involves only minor procedural enhancements to the widely deployed BFD itself. Thus we believe that this proposal is inherently simpler in the protocol itself and deployment. As an example, it does not require the exchange of BFD discriminators over an out-of-band channel before the BFD session bring-up. When BGP Add-Path is deployed at an IXP using the Route Server, multiple BGP paths (when exist) can be made available to the clients of the Router Server as described in . The "unsolicited BFD" can be used in BGP route selection by these clients to eliminate paths with "inaccessible nexthops".

With "unsolicited BFD", one side takes the "Active role" and the other side takes only the "Passive role" as described in . On the passive side, the "unsolicited BFD" SHOULD be explicitly configured on an interface or globally (apply to all interfaces). The BFD parameters can be either per-interface or per-router based. It MAY also choose to use the parameters that the active side uses in its BFD Control packets. The "My Discriminator", however, MUST be chosen to allow multiple unsolicited BFD sessions. The active side starts sending the BFD Control packets as specified in . The passive side does not send BFD Control packets. When the passive side receives a BFD Control packet from the active side with 0 as "Your Discriminator" and does not find an existing BFD session, the passive side MAY create a matching BFD session toward the active side, if permitted by local configuration. It would then start sending the BFD Control packets and perform necessary procedure for bringing up, maintaining and tearing down the BFD session. If the BFD session fails to get established within certain specified time, or if an established BFD session goes down, the passive side would stop sending BFD Control packets and MAY delete the BFD session created until the BFD Control packets is initiated by the active side again. When an Unsolicited BFD session goes down, an implementation MAY retain the session state for a period of time, which may be configurable. Retaining this state can be useful for operational purposes. The "Passive role" may change to the "Active role" when a local client registers for the same BFD session, and from the "Active role" to the "Passive role" when there is no longer any locally registered client for the BFD session.

This document defines a new state variable called Unsolicited Role. bfd.UnsolicitedRole The operational mode of BFD interface when configured for unsolicited behaviour. Options can be either PASSIVE, ACTIVE or NULL (NULL - not initialized) for unsolicited BFD sessions. Default (not configured for unsolicited behaviour) MUST be set to NULL if present on the interface.

This section extends the YANG data model for BFD to cover unsolicited BFD. We import since the "bfd" container in is under "control-plane-protocol".

Configuration for unsolicited BFD parameters for IP single-hop sessions can be done at 2 levels: Globally, i.e. for all interfaces. This requires support for the "unsolicited-params-global" feature. For specific interfaces. This requires support for the "unsolicited-params-per-interface" feature. For operational data, a new "unsolicited" container has been added for BFD IP single-hop sessions. The tree diagram below uses the graphical representation of data models, as defined in .

file "ietf-bfd-unsolicited@2021-11-23.yang" module ietf-bfd-unsolicited { yang-version 1.1; namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-bfd-unsolicited"; prefix "bfd-unsol"; // RFC Ed.: replace occurences of YYYY with actual RFC numbers // and remove this note import ietf-bfd-types { prefix "bfd-types"; reference "RFC 9127: YANG Data Model for Bidirectional Forwarding Detection (BFD)"; } import ietf-bfd { prefix "bfd"; reference "RFC 9127: YANG Data Model for Bidirectional Forwarding Detection (BFD)"; } import ietf-bfd-ip-sh { prefix "bfd-ip-sh"; reference "RFC 9127: YANG Data Model for Bidirectional Forwarding Detection (BFD)"; } import ietf-routing { prefix "rt"; reference "RFC 8349: A YANG Data Model for Routing Management (NMDA version)"; } organization "IETF BFD Working Group"; contact "WG Web: WG List: Editors: Enke Chen (enchen@paloaltonetworks.com), Naiming Shen (naiming@zededa.com), Robert Raszuk (robert@raszuk.net), Reshad Rahman (reshad@yahoo.com)"; description "This module contains the YANG definition for BFD unsolicited as per RFC YYYY. Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as authors of the code. All rights reserved. Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and subject to the license terms contained in, the Simplified BSD License set forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info). This version of this YANG module is part of RFC YYYY; see the RFC itself for full legal notices."; reference "RFC YYYY"; revision 2021-11-23 { description "Initial revision."; reference "RFC YYYY: Unsolicited BFD for Sessionless Applications."; } /* * Feature definitions */ feature unsolicited-params-global { description "This feature indicates that the server supports global parameters for unsolicited sessions."; reference "RFC YYYY: Unsolicited BFD for Sessionless Applications."; } feature unsolicited-params-per-interface { description "This feature indicates that the server supports per-interface parameters for unsolicited sessions."; reference "RFC YYYY: Unsolicited BFD for Sessionless Applications."; } /* * Type Definitions */ typedef unsolicited-role { type enumeration { enum unsolicited-active { description "Active role"; } enum unsolicited-passive { description "Passive role"; } } description "Unsolicited role"; } /* * Augments */ augment "/rt:routing/rt:control-plane-protocols/" + "rt:control-plane-protocol/bfd:bfd/bfd-ip-sh:ip-sh" { if-feature bfd-unsol:unsolicited-params-global; description "Augmentation for BFD unsolicited parameters"; container unsolicited { description "BFD unsolicited top level container"; leaf enabled { type boolean; default false; description "BFD unsolicited enabled globally for IP single-hop."; } uses bfd-types:base-cfg-parms; } } augment "/rt:routing/rt:control-plane-protocols/" + "rt:control-plane-protocol/bfd:bfd/bfd-ip-sh:ip-sh/" + "bfd-ip-sh:interfaces" { if-feature bfd-unsol:unsolicited-params-per-interface; description "Augmentation for BFD unsolicited on IP single-hop interface"; container unsolicited { description "BFD IP single-hop interface unsolicited top level container"; leaf enabled { type boolean; default false; description "BFD unsolicited enabled on this interface."; } uses bfd-types:base-cfg-parms; } } augment "/rt:routing/rt:control-plane-protocols/" + "rt:control-plane-protocol/bfd:bfd/bfd-ip-sh:ip-sh/" + "bfd-ip-sh:sessions/bfd-ip-sh:session" { description "Augmentation for BFD unsolicited on IP single-hop session"; container unsolicited { config false; description "BFD IP single-hop session unsolicited top level container"; leaf role { type bfd-unsol:unsolicited-role; description "Role."; } } } }

]]>



	
	    
            This document registers the following namespace URI in the "IETF XML Registry" :
            
            URI:  urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-bfd-unsolicited
            Registrant Contact:  The IESG.
            XML:  N/A; the requested URI is an XML namespace.
            
            This document registers the following YANG module in the "YANG Module Names" registry :
            
            Name:  ietf-bfd-unsolicited
            Namespace:  urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-bfd-unsolicited
            Prefix:  bfd-unsol
            Reference:  RFC YYYY
	


	 

	Authors would like to thank Acee Lindem, Greg Mirsky, Jeffrey Haas, 
      Raj Chetan and Tom Petch for their review and valuable input. 

	 

	
	   
	    
	    The same security considerations and protection measures as those described 
      in  and  normatively apply 
      to this document. 

	    With "unsolicited BFD" there is potential risk for excessive resource usage 
      by BFD from "unexpected" remote systems. To mitigate such risks, the following 
      measures are mandatory:
	    

	   
     
	   
     Limit the feature to specific interfaces, and to a single-hop BFD with "TTL=255" 
     . For numbered interfaces, the source address of an incoming 
     BFD packet should belong to the subnet of the interface on which the BFD 
     packet is received. For unnumbered interfaces the above check should be aligned 
     with routing protocol addresses running on such pair of interfaces.
     
     
     Apply "policy" to allow BFD packets only from certain subnets or hosts.
      
	    
     Deploy the feature only in certain "trustworthy" environment, e.g., at an IXP, 
     or between a provider and its customers.
	   
	   
     Adjust BFD parameters as needed for the particular deployment and scale.
     
	   
     Use BFD authentication.
     
	   
	    
	   
	   
      The YANG module specified in this document defines a schema for data
      that is designed to be accessed via network management protocols such as
      NETCONF  or RESTCONF .
      The lowest NETCONF layer is the secure transport layer, and the
      mandatory-to-implement secure transport is Secure Shell (SSH) . The lowest RESTCONF layer is HTTPS, and the
      mandatory-to-implement secure transport is TLS .

      The NETCONF access control model  provides
      the means to restrict access for particular NETCONF or RESTCONF users to
      a preconfigured subset of all available NETCONF or RESTCONF protocol
      operations and content.

      There are a number of data nodes defined in this YANG module that are
      writable/creatable/deletable (i.e., config true, which is the default).
      These data nodes may be considered sensitive or vulnerable in some
      network environments. Write operations (e.g., edit-config) to these data
      nodes without proper protection can have a negative effect on network
      operations. These are the subtrees and data nodes and their
      sensitivity/vulnerability:

      /routing/control-plane-protocols/control-plane-protocol/bfd/ip-sh
         /unsolicited:
      
      data node "enabled" enables creation of unsolicited BFD IP single-hop sessions globally, i.e. on all interfaces.
         See .
      data nodes local-multiplier, desired-min-tx-interval,
      required-min-rx-interval and min-interval all impact the parameters of the unsolicited
      BFD IP single-hop sessions.
      
      

      /routing/control-plane-protocols/control-plane-protocol/bfd/ip-sh
         /interfaces/interface/unsolicited:
      
      data node "enabled" enables creation of unsolicited BFD IP single-hop sessions on a specific interface.
         See .
      data nodes local-multiplier, desired-min-tx-interval,
      required-min-rx-interval and min-interval all impact the parameters of the unsolicited
      BFD IP single-hop sessions on the interface.
      
      

      Some of the readable data nodes in this YANG module may be considered
      sensitive or vulnerable in some network environments. It is thus
      important to control read access (e.g., via get, get-config, or
      notification) to these data nodes. These are the subtrees and data nodes
      and their sensitivity/vulnerability:

      /routing/control-plane-protocols/control-plane-protocol/bfd/ip-sh
         /sessions/session/unsolicited:
      access to this information discloses the role of the local system in the creation of the unsolicited BFD session.