]> Huawei Technologies France S.A.S.U.

18, Quai du Point du Jour Boulogne-Billancourt 92100 France houda.labiod@huawei.com

Huawei Technologies France S.A.S.U.

France

Huawei Technologies France S.A.S.U.

18, Quai du Point du Jour Boulogne-Billancourt 92100 France junzhang1@huawei.com

Grenoble INP - Ensimag, LIG Lab

France Andrzej.Duda@imag.fr

Fraunhofer SIT

Rheinstrasse 75 Darmstadt 64295 Germany henk.birkholz@sit.fraunhofer.de

Security RATS Internet-Draft This document proposes an extension to the Remote Attestation Procedures architecture as defined in by introducing the concept of Attester Groups. This extension aims to reduce computational and communication overhead by enabling collective Evidence appraisal of high number of homogeneous devices with similar characteristics, thereby improving the scalability of attestation processes.

Introduction defines Attesters as entities comprising at least one Attesting Environment and one Target Environment co-located in one entity. It also presents different ways to compose the Attesting and Target Environemtns, such as Composite Devices and Layered Attesters. Layed Attester reflects a cascade of staged Environments. It is more related to one device with different layers and there is a relationship between them. However, mechanisms for efficiently managing multiple, independent Attesters are missing. Assessing the trustworthiness of large numbers of independent devices individually can result in high conveyance and processing overhead. This comes into effect particularly when these devices share identical hardware or firmware components, which can lead to redundancy between all individual remote attestation procedures. One example would be a smart factory scenario where numerous sensors of the same model monitor different parts of the manufacturing process. These sensors share identical hardware and firmware configurations. This document proposes a model by which these separate sensors devices can be grouped into a single Attester Group and a shared remote attestation procedure can appraise their authenticity collectively rather than individually. Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA) has a similar concept of using one unique ID for one group of Attesters, but its goal is to mitigate the issue of uniquely (re-)identifiable Attesting Environments, while scalability is the major concern in this document.

 Terminology The following terms are imported from : Attester, Composite Device, Evidence, Layered Attester, Verifier. Newly defined terms for this document:

Attester Group:

A role performed by a group of Attesters whose Evidence must be appraised in order to infer the extent to which the individual Attesters comprising the group are considered trustworthy.

group-id:

A new Attester Identity type (see ). It is a unique identifier assigned to each Attester Group, allowing the group to dynamically adjust its membership without redefining its fundamental identity.

Requirements Notation The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

Attester Group and Comparison to Composite Devices We should be able to leverage the similarities between attesters to avoid redundant attestations. An Attester Group is by definition a dynamic entity. Attesters can join or leave the group, in contrast to Composite Devices that have a static composition with a pre-defined set of Attesting Environments and fixed parameters. The dynamic nature of an Attester Group allows for the flexibility to tailor group parameters. This kind of flexibility facilitates the implementation of various group attestation schemes that can optimize the resources required to conduct remote attestation procedures for large device groups. A composite device is an entity composed of multiple sub entities. Each sub entity is an Attester. In a composite device we can have multiple Attesters with a Lead Attester. The Attesters are appraised via the main Lead Attester's help. The lead Attester generates Evidence about the layout of the whole composite device, while sub-Attesters generate Evidence about their respective (sub-)modules. Composite device model is not enough flexible to represent our definition of attester group where we do need a leader attester nor a composition of evidences of the attesters. The table below summarizes the key differences between the Group Attester concept and the Composite Device concept.

Composite Device	Attester Group
Lead Attester	No Lead Attester
The Composite Device is identifiable by the Lead Attester	The Attester Group is identifiable by a group-id a unique identifier
Composition of Evidence of sub-modules (attesters)	No composition

Attester Group Extension In Section 3 (Architectural Overview) of : we could add a subsection 3.4 titled "Attester Groups". In addidion, Section 2.2 (Non-repudiable Identitythe) of the draft , we could add an Identity Type "group-id" (i.e add another row in the Table 1 in ).

Use Case Scenarios with a large scale network In this section, we provide two examples of applications where all devices are homogeneous with similar characteristics. Use Case 1: Remote maintenance in the aerospace domain Context: EU ASSURED H2020 Project.
Once an aircraft lands, there is the need for the physical presence of an engineer to go and connect to the "head unit" (in the cockpit) for extracting log data so as to check whether something needs to be checked/maintained. We need attestation of all core PLCs and embedded systems responsible for the core functionalities of the aircraft. All attestation reports are remotely sent (in a secure manner) to the control station once landed. We can group the attested elements into different attester groups. Approach: We can consider an attester group of 1000 aircrafts (same manufacturing brand) Use Case 2: Automotive domain, a Vehicle with embedded Electronic Control Units (ECUs) Context: CONNECT EU H2020 project.
The automotive industry is moving to a more hierarchical in-vehicle architecture where ECUs are monitored by Zonal Controllers and these in turn communicate with the Vehicle Computer. This is, for instance, how kinematic data are extracted from the sensors all the way up to the vehicle computer to be encoded into a V2X message. This data need to be associated with Evidence on the integrity of the sensor as a data source and this is where group attestation is an interesting capability. The attester group can be formed for hierarchical-based attestation, like attester group of all in-vehicle ECUs or attested group of vehicles within an intersection. Approach: we can consider an attester group of a fleet of 70000 vehicles (same brand). We can also consider an attester group of similar ECUs.

IANA Considerations This document has no IANA actions

References Normative References Cisco Systems Fraunhofer SIT MIT Linaro Intel This document defines reusable Attestation Result information elements. When these elements are offered to Relying Parties as Evidence, different aspects of Attester trustworthiness can be evaluated. Additionally, where the Relying Party is interfacing with a heterogeneous mix of Attesting Environment and Verifier types, consistent policies can be applied to subsequent information exchange between each Attester and the Relying Party. In many standards track documents several words are used to signify the requirements in the specification. These words are often capitalized. This document defines these words as they should be interpreted in IETF documents. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements. RFC 2119 specifies common key words that may be used in protocol specifications. This document aims to reduce the ambiguity by clarifying that only UPPERCASE usage of the key words have the defined special meanings. Informative References In network protocol exchanges, it is often useful for one end of a communication to know whether the other end is in an intended operating state. This document provides an architectural overview of the entities involved that make such tests possible through the process of generating, conveying, and evaluating evidentiary Claims. It provides a model that is neutral toward processor architectures, the content of Claims, and protocols. Fraunhofer SIT University of Surrey University of Surrey Microsoft This document maps the concept of Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA) to the Remote Attestation Procedures (RATS) Architecture. The protocol entity DAA Issuer is introduced and its mapping with existing RATS roles in DAA protocol steps is specified.

Implementation Considerations Details on creating and maintaining Attester Groups, choosing the number of Lead Attesters, and methods for evidence collection and signing are left to the implementer's discretion, allowing for tailored security measures.