]> Mozilla

mt@lowentropy.net

Private Octopus Inc.

huitema@huitema.net

Fastly

kazuhooku@gmail.com

Meta

matt.joras@gmail.com

Ericsson

marcus.ihlar@ericsson.com

Web and Internet Transport SCONE locomotive pastry On-path network elements can sometimes be configured to apply rate limits to flows that pass them. This document describes a method for signaling to endpoints that rate limiting policies are in force and what that rate limit is. About This Document The latest revision of this draft can be found at . Status information for this document may be found at . Discussion of this document takes place on the SCONE Working Group mailing list (), which is archived at . Subscribe at . Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at .

Introduction Many access networks limit the maximum data rate that attached devices are able to attain. This is often done without any indication to the applications running on devices. The result can be that application performance is degraded, as the manner in which rate limits are enforced can be incompatible with the rate estimation or congestion control algorithms used at endpoints. Having the network indicate what its rate limiting policy is, in a way that is accessible to endpoints, might allow applications to use this information when adapting their send rate. The Transparent Rate Optimization for Network Endpoints (TRONE) protocol is negotiated by QUIC endpoints. This protocol provides a means for network elements to signal the maximum available sustained throughput, or rate limits, for flows of UDP datagrams that transit that network element to a QUIC endpoint.

Overview QUIC endpoints can negotiate the use of TRONE by including a transport parameter () in the QUIC handshake. Endpoints then occasionally coalesce a TRONE packet with ordinary QUIC packets that they send. Network elements that have rate limiting policies can detect flows that include TRONE packets. The network element can indicate a maximum sustained throughput by modifying the TRONE packet as it transits the network element. | TRONE+rate | | +QUIC +---- +QUIC --->| | | | Validate QUIC packet | | | and record rate | | | ]]> QUIC endpoints that receive modified TRONE packets observe the indicated version, process the QUIC packet, and then record the indicated rate. Indicated rate limits apply only in a single direction. Separate indications can be sent for the client-to-server direction and server-to-client direction. The indicated rates do not need to be the same. Indicated rate limits only apply to the path on which they are received. A connection that migrates or uses multipath cannot assume that rate limit indications from one path apply to new paths.

Applicability This protocol only works for flows that use the TRONE packet (). The protocol requires that packets are modified as they transit a network element, which provides endpoints strong evidence that the network element has the power to drop packets; though see for potential limitations on this. The rate limit signal that this protocol carries is independent of congestion signals, limited to a single path and UDP packet flow, unidirectional, and strictly advisory.

Independent of Congestion Signals Rate limit signals are not a substitute for congestion feedback. Congestion signals, such as acknowledgments, provide information on loss, delay, or ECN markings that indicate the real-time condition of a network path. Congestion signals might indicate a throughput that is different from the signaled rate limit. Endpoints cannot assume that a signaled rate limit is achievable if congestion signals indicate otherwise. Congestion could be experienced at a different point on the network path than the network element that indicates a rate limit. Therefore, endpoints need to respect the send rate constraints that are set by a congestion controller.

Unspecified Scope Modifying a packet does not prove that the rate limit that is indicated would be achievable. A signal that is sent for a specific flow is likely enforced at a different scope. The extent of that scope is not carried in the signal. For instance, limits might apply at a network subscription level, such that multiple flows receive the same signal. Endpoints can therefore be more confident in the rate limit signal as an indication of the maximum achievable throughput than as any indication of expected throughput. That throughput will only be achievable when there is no significant data flowing in the same scope. In the presence of other flows, congestion limits are likely to determine actual throughput. This makes the application of signals most usefully applied to a downlink flow in access networks, close to an endpoint. In that case, capacity is less likely to be split between multiple active flows.

Per-Flow Signal The same UDP address tuple might be used for multiple QUIC connections. A single signal might be lost or only reach a single application endpoint. Network elements that signal about a flow might choose to send additional signals, using connection IDs to indicate when new connections could be involved.

Undirectional Signal The endpoint that receives a rate limit signal is not the endpoint that might adapt its sending behavior as a result of receiving the signal. This ensures that the rate limit signal is attached to the flow that it is mostly likely to apply to. An endpoint might need to communicate the value it receives to its peer in order to ensure that the limit is respected. This document does not define how that signaling occurs as this is specific to the application in use.

Advisory Signal A signal does not prove that a higher rate would not be successful. Endpoints that receive this signal therefore need to treat the information as advisory. As an advisory signal, network elements cannot assume that endpoints will respect the signal. Though this might reduce the need for more active rate limiting, how rate limit enforcement is applied is a matter for network policy. The time and scope over which a rate limit applies is not specified. The effective rate limit might change without being signaled. The signaled limit can be assumed to apply to the flow of packets on the same UDP address tuple for the duration of that flow. Rate limiting policies often apply on the level of a device or subscription, but endpoints cannot assume that this is the case. A separate signal can be sent for each flow.

Conventions and Definitions The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

TRONE Packet A TRONE packet is a QUIC long header packet that follows the QUIC invariants; see . shows the format of the TRONE packet using the conventions from .

TRONE Packet Format

The most significant bit (0x80) of the packet indicates that this is a QUIC long header packet. The next bit (0x40) is reserved and can be set according to . The low 6 bits (0x3f) of the first byte are reserved. This packet includes a Destination Connection ID field that is set to the same value as other packets in the same datagram; see . The Source Connection ID field is set to match the Source Connection ID field of any packet that follows. If the next packet in the datagram does not have a Source Connection ID field, which is the case for packets with a short header (), the Source Connection ID field is empty. TRONE packets SHOULD be included as the first packet in a datagram. This is necessary in many cases for QUIC versions 1 and 2 because packets with a short header cannot precede any other packets. The payload of a TRONE packet consists of a single Rate Signal field, described in .

Rate Signals Specification of the the size and format of the Rate Signal field is left for future revisions of this document.

Endpoint Processing of TRONE Packets Processing a TRONE packet involves reading the value from the Rate Signal field. However, this value MUST NOT be used unless another packet from the same datagram is successfully processed. Therefore, a TRONE packet always needs to be coalesced with other QUIC packets. A TRONE packet is defined by the use of the longer header bit (0x80 in the first byte) and the TRONE protocol version (0xTBD in the next four bytes). A TRONE packet MAY be discarded, along with any packets that come after it in the same datagram, if the Source Connection ID is not consistent with those coalesced packets, as specified in . A TRONE packet MUST be discarded if the Destination Connection ID does not match one recognized by the receiving endpoint.

Negotiating TRONE A QUIC endpoint indicates that it is willing to receive TRONE packets by including the trone_supported transport parameter (0xTBD). This transport parameter is valid for QUIC versions 1 and 2 and any other version that recognizes the versions, transport parameters, and frame types registries established in Sections , , and of .

Deployment QUIC endpoints can enable the use of the TRONE protocol by sending TRONE packets . Network elements then apply or replace the Rate Signal field () according to their policies.

Applying Rate Limit Signals A network element detects a TRONE packet by observing that a packet has a QUIC long header and the TRONE protocol version of 0xTBD. A network element then conditionally replaces the Rate Signal field with values of its choosing. A network element might receive a packet that already includes a rate signal. The network element replaces the rate signal if it wishes to signal a lower rate limit; otherwise, the original values are retained, preserving the signal from the network element with the lower policy. The following pseudocode indicates how a network element might detect a TRONE packet and replace an existing rate signal.

Providing Opportunities to Apply Rate Limit Signals Endpoints that wish to offer network elements the option to add rate limit signals can send TRONE packets at any time. This is a decision that a sender makes when constructing datagrams. It is recommended that endpoints promptly send an initial TRONE packet once the peer confirms its willingness to receive them. An endpoint that has not recently sent a TRONE packet MAY treat receipt of one from its peer as a trigger to send a TRONE packet in the reverse direction. This way a peer that is receiving downlink data can influence the frequency of receiving rate signals. Endpoints MUST send any TRONE packet they send as the first packet of a datagram, coalesced with additional packets. An endpoint that receives and discards a TRONE packet without also successfully processing another packet from the same datagram SHOULD ignore any rate limit signal. Such a datagram might be entirely spoofed. A network element that wishes to signal an updated rate limit waits for the next TRONE packet in the desired direction. However, if no TRONE packet arrives within a reasonable time, the network element MAY construct its own TRONE packet and prepend it to a QUIC packet before forwarding. This process requires expanding the UDP datagram containing the original QUIC packet, which might cause the datagram to exceed the path MTU. Therefore, a network element SHOULD NOT expand UDP datagrams if the combined payload of the TRONE packet and the subsequent packets exceeds 1200 bytes, the smallest maximum datagram size supported by QUIC versions 1 and 2 (see ).

Feedback To Sender About Signals Information about rate limits is intended for the sending application. Any signal from network elements can be propagated to the receiving application using an implementation-defined mechanism. This document does not define a means for indicating what was received. That is, the expectation is that any signal is propagated to the application for handling, not handled automatically by the transport layer. How a receiving application communicates the rate limit signal to a sending application will depend on the application in use. Different applications can choose different approaches. For example, in an application where a receiver drives rate adaptation, it might not be necessary to define additional signaling. A sender can use any acknowledgment mechanism provided by the QUIC version in use to learn whether datagrams containing TRONE packets were likely received. This might help inform whether to send additional TRONE packets in the event that a datagram is lost. However, rather than relying on transport signals, an application might be better able to indicate what has been received and processed. TRONE packets could be stripped from datagrams in the network, which cannot be reliably detected. This could result in a sender falsely believing that no network element applied a rate limit signal.

Security Considerations The modification of packets provides endpoints proof that a network element is in a position to drop datagrams and thereby enforce the indicated rate limit. states that endpoints only accept signals if the datagram contains a packet that it accepts to prevent an off-path attacker from inserting spurious rate limit signals. Some off-path attackers may be able to both observe traffic and inject packets. Attackers with such capabilities could observe packets sent by an endpoint, create datagrams coalescing an arbitrary TRONE packet and the observed packet, and send these datagrams such that they arrive at the peer endpoint before the original packet. Spoofed packets that seek to advertise a higher limit than might otherwise be permitted also need to bypass any rate limiters. The attacker will thus get arbitrary TRONE packets accepted by the peer, with the result being that the endpoint receives a false or misleading rate limit. The recipient of a rate limit signal therefore cannot guarantee that the signal was generated by an on-path network element. However, the capabilities required of an off-path attacker are substantially similar to those of on path elements. The actual value of the rate limit signal is not authenticated. Any signal might be incorrectly set in order to encourage endpoints to behave in ways that are not in their interests. Endpoints are free to ignore limits that they think are incorrect. The congestion controller employed by a sender provides real-time information about the rate at which the network path is delivering data. Similarly, if there is a strong need to ensure that a rate limit is respected, network elements cannot assume that the signaled limit will be respected by endpoints.

Privacy Considerations The focus of this analysis is the extent to which observing TRONE packets could be used to gain information about endpoints. This might be leaking details of how applications using QUIC operate or leaks of endpoint identity when using additional privacy protection, such as a VPN. Any network element that can observe the content of that packet can read the rate limit that was applied. Any signal is visible on the path, from the point at which it is applied to the point at which it is consumed at an endpoint. On path elements can also alter the TRONE signal to try trigger specific reactions and gain further knowledge. In the general case of a client connected to a server through the Internet, we believe that TRONE does not provide much advantage to attackers. The identities of the clients and servers are already visible through their IP addresses. Traffic analysis tools already provide more information than the data rate limits set by TRONE. There are two avenues of attack that require more analysis:

• that the passive observation of TRONE packets might help identify or distinguish endpoints; and
• that active manipulation of TRONE signals might help reveal the identity of endpoints that are otherwise hidden behind VPNs or proxies.

Passive Attacks If only few clients and server pairs negotiate the usage of TRONE, the occasional observation of TRONE packets will "stick out". That observation, could be combined with observation of timing and volume of traffic to help identify the endpoint or categorize the application that they are using. A variation of this issue occurs if TRONE is widely implemented, but only used in some specific circumstances. In that case, observation of TRONE packets reveals information about the state of the endpoint. If multiple servers are accessed through the same front facing server, Encrypted Client Hello (ECH) may be used to prevent outside parties to identify which specific server a client is using. However, if only a few of these servers use TRONE, any TRONE packets will help identify which specific server a client is using. This issue will be mitigated if TRONE becomes widely implemented, and if the usage of TRONE is not limited to the type of applications that make active use of the signal. QUIC implementations are therefore encouraged to make the feature available unconditionally. Endpoints might send TRONE packets whenever a peer can accept them.

Active Attacks Suppose a configuration in which multiple clients use a VPN or proxy service to access the same server. The attacker sees the IP addresses in the packets behind VPN and proxy and also between the users and the VPN, but it does not know which VPN address corresponds to what user address. Suppose now that the attacker selects a flow on the link between the VPN/proxy and server. The attacker applies rate limit signals to TRONE packets in that flow. The attacker chooses a bandwidth that is lower than the "natural" bandwidth of the connection. A reduction in the rate of flows between client and VPN/proxy might allow the attacker to link the altered flow to the client. | | +--------+ +--------+ | VPN |<==========>| | | Client |------------->| / |<==========>| Server | +--------+ | Proxy |<==========>| | .---->| | ^ +--------+ +--------+ / +-------+ | | Client |======' | +--------+ ^ Apply rate limit signal \ \ Observe change ]]> An attacker that can manipulate TRONE headers can also simulate congestion signals by dropping packets or by setting the ECN CE bit. That will also likely result in changes in the congestion response by the affected client. A VPN or proxy could defend against this style of attack by removing TRONE (and ECN) signals. There are few reasons to provide per-flow rate limit signals in that situation. Endpoints might also either disable this feature or ignore any signals when they are aware of the use of a VPN or proxy.

IANA Considerations This document registers a new QUIC version () and a QUIC transport parameter ().

TRONE Version This document registers the following entry to the "QUIC Versions" registry maintained at https://www.iana.org/assignments/quic, following the guidance from .

Value:

0xTBD

Status:

permanent

Specification:

This document

Change Controller:

IETF (iesg@ietf.org)

Contact:

QUIC Working Group (quic@ietf.org)

Notes:

TRONE Protocol

trone_supported Transport Parameter This document registers the trone_supported transport parameter in the "QUIC Transport Parameters" registry maintained at https://www.iana.org/assignments/quic, following the guidance from .

Value:

0xTBD

Parameter Name:

trone_supported

Status:

Permanent

Specification:

This document

Date:

This date

Change Controller:

IETF (iesg@ietf.org)

Contact:

QUIC Working Group (quic@ietf.org)

Notes:

(none)

References Normative References This document defines the core of the QUIC transport protocol. QUIC provides applications with flow-controlled streams for structured communication, low-latency connection establishment, and network path migration. QUIC includes security measures that ensure confidentiality, integrity, and availability in a range of deployment circumstances. Accompanying documents describe the integration of TLS for key negotiation, loss detection, and an exemplary congestion control algorithm. This document defines the properties of the QUIC transport protocol that are common to all versions of the protocol. In many standards track documents several words are used to signify the requirements in the specification. These words are often capitalized. This document defines these words as they should be interpreted in IETF documents. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements. RFC 2119 specifies common key words that may be used in protocol specifications. This document aims to reduce the ambiguity by clarifying that only UPPERCASE usage of the key words have the defined special meanings. This document describes a method for negotiating the ability to send an arbitrary value for the second-most significant bit in QUIC packets. This document specifies QUIC version 2, which is identical to QUIC version 1 except for some trivial details. Its purpose is to combat various ossification vectors and exercise the version negotiation framework. It also serves as a template for the minimum changes in any future version of QUIC. Note that "version 2" is an informal name for this proposal that indicates it is the second version of QUIC to be published as a Standards Track document. The protocol specified here uses a version number other than 2 in the wire image, in order to minimize ossification risks. Informative References Alibaba Inc. Uber Technologies Inc. University of Mons (UMONS) UCLouvain and Tessares Private Octopus Inc. Ericsson This document specifies a multipath extension for the QUIC protocol to enable the simultaneous usage of multiple paths for a single connection. Discussion Venues This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC. Discussion of this document takes place on the QUIC Working Group mailing list (quic@ietf.org), which is archived at https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/quic/. Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at https://github.com/quicwg/multipath. This memo specifies the incorporation of ECN (Explicit Congestion Notification) to TCP and IP, including ECN's use of two bits in the IP header. [STANDARDS-TRACK]

Acknowledgments Jana Iyengar has made significant contributions to the original TRAIN specification that forms the basis for a large part of this document.