<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>

<!DOCTYPE rfc SYSTEM "rfc2629-xhtml.ent">

<rfc xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude"
	submissionType="independent" category="exp"
	docName="draft-vesely-dmarc-mlm-transform-08"
	ipr="trust200902" obsoletes="" updates="" xml:lang="en"
	tocInclude="true" tocDepth="2" symRefs="true" sortRefs="false" version="3"> 

	<front>
		<title abbrev="MLM Transformations">
	Mailing List Manager (MLM) Transformations</title>

		<seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-vesely-dmarc-mlm-transform-08"/>

		<author fullname="Alessandro Vesely" initials="A." surname="Vesely">
			<organization/>
			<address>
				<postal>
					<street>v. L. Anelli 13</street>
					<code>20122</code>
					<city>Milano</city>
					<region>MI</region>
					<country>Italy</country>
				</postal>
				<email>vesely@tana.it</email>
			</address>
		</author>
		<date day="28" month="August" year="2023"/>
		<keyword>DMARC</keyword>
		<keyword>DKIM</keyword>
		<keyword>Mailing List</keyword>
		<keyword>MLM</keyword>
		<abstract>
			<t>
	The widespread adoption of Domain-based Message Authentication,
	Reporting, and Conformance (DMARC) led Mailing List Managers (MLM)
	to rewrite the From: header field as a workaround.</t>
			<t>
	This document proposes a methods to to revert MLM transformations, 
	in order to restore the original From: line after reception.  The 
	method only works with some MLMs and some signing patterns.</t>
		</abstract>
	</front>

	<middle>
		<section numbered="true" toc="default">
			<name>Introduction</name>

			<t>
	Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting, and Conformance
	(DMARC) (<xref target="RFC7489"/>) hinges on the alignment of the
	domain in the From: header field with an authenticated identifier.
	For that reason, mailing list managers (MLMs) that transform
	messages, however lightly, have to rewrite From:; an operation
	known as From: munging.</t>

			<t>
	Depending on the kind of mailing list, From: munging can annoy
	participants or not.  For lists paired by web fora, for example,
	it is almost unnoticed.  For other lists, where personal knowledge
	plays a role, it can become a nuisance as it hinders off-list
	messaging.</t>

			<t>
	One way to restore the end-to-end nature of the From: email 
	field is to revert it to its original value after the message 
	is delivered to the final subscriber's mailbox.  This requires 
	that the MLM saves the original value.  For security reasons, 
	this replacement should only be done after verifying the 
	original DKIM signature, following reversion of MLM 
	transformation.</t>

			<t>
	The method works with MLMs configured to add just a footer and 
	a subject tag to the messages that they redistribute, which is 
	what "classic" MLMs currently do.  The method requires no 
	conferral of trust, but needs author domains to produce "easy" 
	signatures, which several domains do but not all.</t>
		</section>

		<section numbered="true" toc="default">
			<name>Terms Definitions</name>
			<t>
	<strong>Signers</strong> and <strong>verifiers</strong> are 
	defined by DKIM (<xref target="RFC6376"/>).  The use of the 
	term <strong>Mailing List Manager</strong>, almost always 
	abbreviated <strong>MLM</strong> follows <xref 
	target="RFC6377"/>. A MLM is a kind of 
	<strong>Mediator</strong> in <xref target="RFC5598"/> parlance. 
	It is usually composed of a Message Transfer Agent (MTA) with 
	the usual suit of tools plus the mailing list software proper 
	and any home brewed additions.</t>
			<t>
	<strong>Message</strong> is defined in <xref target="RFC5322"/>.  It
	consists of a <strong>header</strong> made up of one or more
	<strong>fields</strong>, and a <strong>body</strong> possibly
	composed of various MIME <strong>entities</strong>, the latter
	being defined in <xref target="RFC2045"/> and companions.</t>
			<t>
	The term <strong>original</strong> is used here to refer to the Author
	or parts of the Author's message as it was sent out by the author's
	domain, where <strong>Author</strong> is defined in
	<xref target="RFC5598"/> and <xref target="RFC9057"/>.</t>

			<t>
	We use <strong>colon</strong> (:) to indicate header field names,
	as in From:, Author: and the like.</t>

			<t>
	The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL
	NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED",
	"MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as
	described in BCP 14 <xref target="RFC2119"/> <xref target="RFC8175"/>
	when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.</t>
		</section>

		<section anchor="trans" numbered="true" toc="default">
			<name>Revertible Transformations</name>
			<t>
	Message modifications can affect the header and/or the body of a
	message.  This document only considers a very limited set of
	transformations, described in the following subsections.
	They turn out to be revertible.</t>
			<section numbered="true" toc="default">
				<name>Header Transformations</name>
				<section numbered="true" toc="default">
					<name>Subject</name>
					<t>
	MLM MAY modify the Subject: field by inserting a tag at the
	beginning of its value.  A tag consists of a short text delimited
	by square brackets.  For example:</t>
					<sourcecode name=""><![CDATA[
  Subject: [added tag] Original value of subject
]]></sourcecode>
					<t>
	This transformation is easily reverted by removing the tag.
	For security reasons, subject tags MUST NOT exceed 20 characters.</t>

					<t>
	Note that some MLMs carry out further changes to this field.
	For example:</t>
					<sourcecode name=""><![CDATA[
  Subject: AW: [MLM-tag] German reply subject
]]></sourcecode>
					<t>can be transformed to:</t>
					<sourcecode name=""><![CDATA[
  Subject: Re: [MLM-tag] German reply subject
]]></sourcecode>
					<t>
	That's why, if the field is signed, it is RECOMMENDED to save a copy
	of it as Original-Subject:.</t>
				</section>
				<section numbered="true" toc="default">
					<name>From</name>
					<t>
	From: rewriting is necessary for DMARC.  That way, the MLM domain
	becomes the primary identifier of a message, in the DMARC sense.
	It is often achieved by transforming a field like this:</t>

					<sourcecode name=""><![CDATA[
  From: Original User <user@example.com>
]]></sourcecode>
					<t>into one like the following:</t>
					<sourcecode name=""><![CDATA[
  From: Original User via MLM <MLM.post@list.example>
]]></sourcecode>

					<t>
	Many MLMs save the original From: in a variety of places, 
	including Reply-To:, Cc:, X-Original-From:.  When the original 
	value is known, the transformation is revertible.</t>

				</section>
			</section>
			<section numbered="true" toc="default">
				<name>Body Transformations</name>
				<t>
	We only consider footer addition.  It MUST be performed in one of
	three ways, according to the format of the original message.</t>
				<dl newline="true">
					<dt>
	Single-part plain text</dt>
					<dd>
	When the original message is not structured, a footer can be appended
	at the end of the original text.
	See example in <xref target="example-single"/></dd>
					<dt>
	Multipart added</dt>
					<dd>
	The footer stands in its own MIME entity, which is appended as the
	last part of an original multipart/mixed structure.
	See example in <xref target="example-added"/></dd>
					<dt>
	Multipart wrapped</dt>
					<dd>
	The footer stands in the second entity of a new multipart/mixed
	MIME structure whose first entity consists of the original body.
	See example in <xref target="example-wrapped"/></dd>
				</dl>
				<t>
	The footer begins with a line consisting exclusively of underscore 
	("_", ASCII 95) characters, at least four of them.  Alternatively,
	a footer can consist of the three characters "-- " (dash, dash, space),
	the Usenet signature convention (see for example
	<xref target="RFC3676" sectionFormat="of" section="4.3"/>).
	For security 
	reasons, the footer MUST belong to an entity of Content-Type: 
	text/plain in all cases.  In addition, footers cannot exceed 10 
	lines of text, each shorter than 80 characters.
	If these restrictions are not met, the transformation cannot be
	reverted safely.</t>
			</section>

		</section>

		<section anchor="algo" numbered="true" toc="default">
			<name>Outline of a Reverting Verifier</name>
			<t>
	This subsection is informative.</t>
			<t>
	The algorithm described here is implemented in a mail filter
	<xref target="zdkimfilter"/>.  These kind of filters
	usually read the input message twice —first pass, verify; last 
	pass, rewrite the message to insert Authentication-Results:.
	When enabling MLM transformation reversion, there can be a 
	retry pass in between those two.
	The result is yielded during the SMTP dialogue with no noticeable 
	delay. Implementing reversion changed the software from 22730 lines 
	of C code to 26762.  The bulk of such ~18% increase is due to the 
	addition of encoding conversion functions. Changes involve both 
	verifying and signing functions (see <xref target="sigrole"/> for 
	the latter).</t>
			<t>
	While reading the header in the first pass, the verifier looks for
	specific fields:</t>
			<ul>
				<li>From:</li>
				<li>Author:</li>
				<li>Original-From:</li>
				<li>X-Original-From:</li>
				<li>Reply-To:</li>
				<li>Cc:</li>
			</ul>
			<t>
	These are candidates to the original mailbox.  Note that Reply-To:
	and Cc: may contain multiple mailboxes; only the first one is 
	considered.</t>
			<t>
	The verifier also collects the Subject: and any field named 
	Original-* that the original signer might have set to ease the
	reversion.
	On reaching the end of the header, during the first pass, the verifier
	sorts the candidate original mailboxes according to the display name,
	which MLMs try and keep unaltered.
	The best candidate is then added to the collected
	set of Original-* fields.
	If the Subject: begins with a tag, its version without tag is added
	to that set as well, unless one was already found as Original-Subject:.</t>
			<t>
	Next, before reading the body, the verifier looks for prospect
	signatures; that is, signatures whose "d=" domain is not aligned with
	SPF credentials (<xref target="RFC7208"/>),
	List-Post: (<xref target="RFC4201"/>), Sender:, or the munged From:
	(if deemed to have been munged).  If any such signature exist,
	along with MLM or other signatures, then the verifier enables parsing
	the body to look for a footer.</t>
			<t>
	Reversing verifiers also have to watch out for idiosyncrasies used to
	mask DKIM signatures.  For example, a MLM introduced a header field
	named X-Mailman-Original-DKIM-Signature, because some receivers took
	the habit to downgrade messages with failed signatures, despite
	<xref target="RFC6376"/> recommendation to consider an unauthenticated
	message regardless of whether or not it looks like it was signed.</t>

			<t>
	Body parsing is done in parallel with body canonicalization during
	the first pass.
	For multipart, track top level entities.  Set transformation type
	to "wrapped" if there are exactly two entities, "added" otherwise.
	However, some lists, perhaps out of misconfiguration, insert an empty
	attachment before the one containing the footer.  As it is unlikely
	that a mail client sends an empty attachment, heuristically it may
	be preferable to just not count it.
	For single-part, body parsing must avail of encoding conversions as
	needed.  Assume identity encoding, 7bit or 8bit, unless
	otherwise directed by an Original-Content-Transfer-Encoding: field.</t>
			<t>
	At the end of the first pass, the verifier knows how prospect
	signatures did.  Let's recall that DKIM signature verification
	results from two independent operations, steps 3 and 4 in
	<xref target="RFC6376" sectionFormat="of" section="6.1.3"/>.
	The signature in the "b=" tag depends on the header, while the body
	hash in the "bh=" tag depends on the body:</t>
			<ul>
				<li>
	If the signature "b=" did not verify and the set of Original-* fields
	is not empty, then it is worth to try and re-canonicalize the header
	using the values in the set of Original-* fields.</li>
				<li>
	If the body hash "bh=" did not match and a footer was found, then it
	is worth to try and re-canonicalize the body excluding the footer.</li>
			</ul>
			<t>
	None, one, or both of the above operations are performed in the retry pass.</t>
			<t>
	On writing Authentication-Results, if a prospect signature 
	verifies after reversion, the verifier must signal this fact. 
	How to signal it is a question of local settings and 
	convenience. It can consist of an apposite reason or comment in 
	Authentication-Results:, or it can just write dmarc=pass. It 
	can also add an Original-From: field as a signal that From: can 
	be restored to that value, having previously removed or renamed 
	any existing field with the same name. For example:</t>
			<sourcecode name=""><![CDATA[
Original-From: Original Author <author@example.org>
Authentication-Results: example.com;
  spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=list.example;
  dkim=pass reason="transformed" header.d=example.org;
  dkim=pass (whitelisted) header.d=list.example;
  dmarc=pass header.from=example.org;
			]]></sourcecode>
			<t>
	That way, reversion elements can be easily recognized and parsed by
	downstream agents.  It is up to the delivery agent to restore 
	the original value of From:, after any possible forwarding has 
	been executed.</t>
		</section>

		<section anchor="roles" numbered="true" toc="default">
			<name>Actors Roles and Compliance</name>
			<section anchor="sigrole" numbered="true" toc="default">
				<name>Original Signer</name>

			<t>
	Author domains who DKIM-sign outgoing messages can copy the 
	value of From: to Author:, at least when one or more recipients 
	are MLMs.  Omission to do so may limit the success of this 
	method to MLMs that add the Author: field themselves.  Signing 
	Author: denotes an interest in this experiment.  In this case, 
	DMARC aggregate results are reported to the Author: domain as 
	well.</t>

			<t>
	In addition, Author domains who DKIM-sign outgoing messages 
	MUST NOT sign header fields that MLMs will change, namely:</t>
			<ul>
				<li>MIME-Version:</li>
				<li>Content-Type:</li>
				<li>Content-Transfer-Encoding:</li>
				<li>Resent-Date:, Resent-From:, Resent-To:, Resent-Cc:</li>
				<li>List-Id:, List-Help:, List-Unsubscribe:, List-Subscribe:, List-Post:,
      List-Owner:, List-Archive:</li>
			</ul>
			<t>
	Not signing Content-Type: implies that author domains MUST NOT use
	the l= signature tag, according to
	<xref target="RFC6376" sectionFormat="of" section="5.4.1"/>.
	</t>

			<t>
	Furthermore, the original value of the signed fields SHOULD be
	mirrored by corresponding fields, From: copied to Author:, the other
	fields to an Original-*: field, that is Reply-To: copied to
	Original-Reply-To:, Subject: to Original-Subject: and so forth.
	Copying Date: is actually not necessary.  Copying Reply-To:, To: and Cc:
	is only useful if there are multiple recipients and the MLM changes
	their order.
	Original-Subject: is necessary if it starts with a tag that can be
	removed when attempting to recover the original value; this field
	is defined by <xref target="RFC5703"/>, where similar considerations
	hold.
	Mailbox providers ignore this
	requirement if they are not aware of this experiment or don't
	participate.  In many cases, the method succeeds anyway.</t>

				<t>
	Other generic rules to ease reversion are as follows:</t>
				<ul>
					<li>
	DKIM signatures MUST use the "relaxed" canonicalization, at least
	for the header, since MLMs may reflow header fields.</li>
					<li>
	The quoted-printable encoding MUST NOT be used for the body of
	single-part text/plain messages, as it is impossible to guess
	original soft line breaks after re-encoding.  Base64 is much more
	robust.</li>
					<li>
	Single-part text/plain messages encoded as base64 MUST follow a
	constant column width of 76 characters (which is what most encoders do.)
	The encoding MUST be
	advertised by adding a new header field as follows:</li>
				</ul>
				<sourcecode name=""><![CDATA[
  Original-Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
]]></sourcecode>
				<ul>
					<li>
	Original-*: fields
	with an empty value stand for non-existing counterparts.</li>
				</ul>

			</section>
			<section numbered="true" toc="default">
				<name>MLM</name>

			<t>
	MLMs MUST limit message changes to the revertible transformations
	described in <xref target="trans"/>.
	Since DKIM is MIME-agnostic, attention must be paid to preserve the
	exact preamble and epilogue of the original MIME structure.
	Several "classic" mailing lists behave in that way.
	</t>
				<t>
	MLMs MUST apply their own DKIM signature.</t>
				<t>
	It is RECOMMENDED that MLMs insert a mailbox entry to Reply-To: or Cc:
	in order to ease off-list replies as well as to allow transformation
	reversion.</t>
				<t>
	MLMs which collect posts from other MLMs must avoid to add their
	own footer and subject tag.  Transformation reversion cannot be stacked.
	A second-level MLM can modify or replace the content of previous
	transformations.  Attention must be paid to not exceed tag and footer
	length limits.</t>
			</section>


			<section numbered="true" toc="default">
				<name>Verifier</name>

				<t>
	Attempts to verify original signatures can be done as outlined
	in <xref target="algo"/>.  The reversion MUST NOT alter the
	messages signed and distributed by MLMs, except for adding an
	Authentication-Results: header field, and possibly an
	Original-From: or other header field used as a signal to downstream
	agents.</t>
				<t>
	If an original signature with rewritten From: is recovered, the 
	verifier MUST make sure that the original value of From: is 
	written out in a field agreed upon by downstream agents, 
	typically Original-From:, which <xref target="RFC5703"/> 
	suggests for a similar use.  However, <xref target="RFC7960"/> 
	suggests that Original-From: be added by mediators as well.  
	Whatever field is used, the filter SHALL make sure it doesn't 
	already exist. A mail delivery agent (MDA) downstream MAY 
	combine the Authentication-Results: with that field to restore 
	the original value of From:. Replacing From: can invalidate the 
	message, therefore, it must be done after any dot-forward 
	processing, so that external verifiers receive the message as 
	distributed by the MLM, and can revert transformations by 
	themselves.</t>
				<t>
	If the Author: field is found and if it is included in
	the h= tag of the original signature, the corresponding DMARC
	record SHOULD be looked up and its "rua=" and "ruf=" tags considered
	for feedback reports, whatever the result.
	Omitting feedback can hamper the tuning of DKIM signatures at remote sites.
	A verifier can ignore reporting if it hasn't yet enabled it at all.</t>

	<t>If applying DMARC policies is considered, it is the From: 
	field which rules.</t>
			</section>
		</section>

		<section numbered="true" toc="default">
			<name>Security Considerations</name>
			<t>
	Rewriting the From: header field is a treacherous modification to
	messages.  It fosters the belief that the display name of a
	mailbox is more true than the angle address.  A belief
	further consented by the tendency to not even display the latter.
	Bad actors take advantage of this belief by displaying the names of
	trusted institutions paired with trash email addresses hidden between
	angle brackets.  That trick defeats DMARC's purpose.</t>
			<t>
	It is out of this document's scope to suggest how mail user agents
	(MUAs) could counter phishing by highlighting security indicators
	(for the extent that indicators can actually help preventing phishing attacks).
	Let's just note that MUAs have to cope with MLMs and phishing alike,
	which makes it hard to devise a pattern to tell apart one from the
	other without getting involved with the reputation of the specific
	domains.</t>
			<t>
	By safely restoring munged From: to the original value in the 
	MDA, that contrast is eliminated.  Then, perhaps, deceptive 
	From: lines might become amenable to some kind of efficient 
	indication.</t>
			<t>
	Of course, MLM role can be played by miscreants as well.  However,
	replaying a signed message, even with revertible transformations, has
	more limits than forging scam messages anew.  Therefore, the risk
	introduced by easing transformation reversion is considerably
	lower than that of not signing, or of keeping DMARC policy at "none".</t>

			<t>
	An unlikely risk is that of a fake MLM sending messages with Author:
	signed by a broken signature in order to trick a reverting verifier
	into sending fake feedback reports.
			</t>
			<t>
	Compared with the use of "l=" tag (<xref target="RFC6376"
	sectionFormat="of" section="8.2"/>), the fact that footers are
	written in plain text removes the main security objection about
	footer additions.
	Namely, footers cannot completely replace the original content in
	the end recipient's eyes by exploiting lax HTML parsing in the MUA.</t>
			<t>
	Still, a footer can contain dangerous URLs and deceiving text.  That
	possibility has to be countered by usual mail filtering and savvy
	behavior.</t>
		</section>

		<section numbered="true" toc="default">
			<name>IANA Considerations</name>
			<t>
	IANA maintains the "Message Header" registry with several subregistries.
	IANA is asked to make the assignments set out in the following section.
			</t>
			<section numbered="true" toc="default">
				<name>Provisional Message Header Field Names</name>
				<t>
	IANA is asked to create new entries in the "Provisional Message
	Header Field Names" registry as follows.</t>
				<table align="center">
					<thead>
						<tr>
							<th align="left">Header Field Name</th>
							<th align="left">Applicable Protocol</th>
							<th align="left">Status</th>
							<th align="left">Author/Change controller</th>
							<th align="left">Reference</th>
						</tr>
					</thead>
					<tbody>
						<tr>
							<td align="left">Original-Content-Transfer-Encoding</td>
							<td align="left">mail</td>
							<td align="left">provisional</td>
							<td align="left">IETF</td>
							<td align="left">this I-D</td>
						</tr>
						<tr>
							<td align="left">Original-Reply-To</td>
							<td align="left">mail</td>
							<td align="left">provisional</td>
							<td align="left">IETF</td>
							<td align="left">this I-D</td>
						</tr>
						<tr>
							<td align="left">Original-Cc</td>
							<td align="left">mail</td>
							<td align="left">provisional</td>
							<td align="left">IETF</td>
							<td align="left">this I-D</td>
						</tr>
					</tbody>
				</table>
			</section>
		</section>

	</middle>

	<back>
		<references>
			<name>References</name>
			<references>
				<name>Normative References</name>
				<xi:include href="https://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.2045.xml"/>
				<xi:include href="https://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.2119.xml"/>
				<xi:include href="https://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.5321.xml"/>
				<xi:include href="https://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.5322.xml"/>
				<xi:include href="https://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.6376.xml"/>
				<xi:include href="https://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.7489.xml"/>
				<xi:include href="https://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8175.xml"/>
				<xi:include href="https://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8617.xml"/>
				<xi:include href="https://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.9057.xml"/>
			</references>
			<references>
				<name>Informative References</name>
				<xi:include href="https://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.3676.xml"/>
				<xi:include href="https://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.4201.xml"/>
				<xi:include href="https://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.5703.xml"/>
				<xi:include href="https://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.5598.xml"/>
				<xi:include href="https://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.6377.xml"/>
				<xi:include href="https://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.7208.xml"/>
				<xi:include href="https://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.7960.xml"/>
				<xi:include href="https://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8601.xml"/>
				<reference anchor="zdkimfilter" target="https://www.tana.it/sw/zdkimfilter/">
					<front>
						<title>zdkimfilter</title>
						<author/>
						<date/>
					</front>
				</reference>
			</references>
		</references>
		<section anchor="examples"  numbered="true" toc="default">
			<name>Examples</name>
			<t>
	In the examples that follow, the first character of each wrapped line
	of DKIM-Signature: fields should be a TAB.  For editorial reasons, it
	is rendered as four spaces.  While visually there is little difference,
	those signatures won't verify unless replacing them with a TAB.</t>
			<t>
	To verify the examples, public keys can be set as follows:</t>
			<sourcecode name=""><![CDATA[
s._domainkey.example.com IN TXT ( "v=DKIM1; g=*; k=rsa; "
"p=MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQCqlye7m5zLLXoIpBp2OO05LNMqK"
"u0zKowoHOpyRpviOVqOaNCk5uZ+wY00JwrKbt5u1G1ghuXsFkFkl0h00LBurz7ivyZH"
"3LohSWOZ8okgR+8kuGu9GHtQ+MqgRd16tlCF8PlWS2kGaBQKua1zk+ZCDwFy82Uo5G2"
"1nu/+Nn2sUwIDAQAB" )

s._domainkey.lists.example IN TXT ( "v=DKIM1; k=rsa; "
"p=MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQDgnLb2TZ6KECBMBo9ZLqDFt4ZBz"
"NHFrgBj/LVJVFU8IQP8uH4G8Pj0mEHRo1qpf0vuFI2HVpe/3NhzkT4Ay/1ZIIsxY754"
"f2thlhBvKh4AAgZFmzRvA3aZs6Tb/ERmD+a51liEMFaTOmY4mWeLi9wOM51usQ9Q65i"
"8IP/vjHM3rQIDAQAB" )
]]></sourcecode>

			<section anchor="example-single"  numbered="true" toc="default">
				<name>Single-part plain text</name>
				<t>
	Base64 encoding has to be decoded in order to locate the footer.
	The original encoding was text/plain, this can be inferred by the
	verifier from the absence of an Original-Content-Transfer-Encoding:
	field.  The original body hash will match after decoding and
	removing the footer.
	Note that an "l=" tag couldn't have done the trick in this case.</t>
				<sourcecode name=""><![CDATA[
Received: from lists.example by subscriber.example.org with ESMTP
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=simple/simple; d=lists.example; s=s;
    t=1603901305; bh=MjC5ikx26j8beyDJiz7Rk/4W+ppdGOmqh6koz0gLa8o=;
    h=Date:From:To:Subject;
    b=PNIYHGd7aytHEvew44WRpSfl4Py3c/9mKjovvQ1ps/xdpkl1/z+gWeu8e8ZmR7gdE
     iT2TsJ7ni3Lfp5oUpGCko5MvCoqcKX7Zmq3CmXTxRTwwvVZrAp/ir8UTvG+rJFnyEZ
     Yi3dSTX4rKe2LotyLkqcs+/uXaWEADbqcBp/9iHo=
Received: from mail.example.com by lists.example with ESMTP
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=simple/simple; d=example.com; s=s;
    t=1603889142; bh=hrDXocZNPy1+eUFYIk1PVRKa6mUMb8+ql9CFNABacww=;
    h=Date:From:To:Subject;
    b=YFLwvvW5bGbE5HpJwBM1JoL1F9b8AxdVFlwE/vOkL0p/pPpr7g9KnPXqwoEXZgFI0
     /kkTHK/Afy4gaWZQfwDZ77LuxYSMFjwpNorSc0YEGzHYzLCN7rL1e+xE7B7kOCThiq
     ebaMdcaHeZF6QUmWcUkEj8LVkxrvWi+bTzd3RnaA=
Original-From: Author <user@example.com>
Received: from mua.example.com by mail.example.com with ESMTPA
Message-ID: <123456@author.example>
Date: Mon, 28 Oct 2020 13:12:55 +0100
From: Author <user@example.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
To: MLM@lists.example
Subject: [example] Check simple MLM message
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64

VGhpcyBpcyBhIHBsYWluIHRleHQgbWVzc2FnZSBzdWJtaXR0ZWQgdG8gYSBtYWlsaW5nIGxpc3Qu
ClRoZSBtYWlsaW5nIGxpc3QgaXMgZXhwZWN0ZWQgdG8gYWRkIGEgZm9vdGVyIGFuZCBhIHN1Ympl
Y3QgdGFnLgoKQmVzdApBdXRob3IKCl9fX19fX19fX19fX19fX19fX19fX19fX19fX19fX19fX19f
X19fX18KdGhpcyBtZXNzYWdlIHdhcyBtb2RpZmllZCBieSBNTE0gZXhhbXBsZQphZGRpbmcgdGhp
cyBmb290ZXIgYW5kIHRoZSBzdWJqZWN0IHRhZwoobm90ZSB0aGF0IGw9IGlzIG5vdCBzZXQpCg==
]]></sourcecode>
			</section>
			<section anchor="example-added"  numbered="true" toc="default">
				<name>Multipart added</name>
				<t>
	When the original message has a MIME structure, MLMs can append an
	entity.</t>
				<sourcecode name=""><![CDATA[
Received: from lists.example by subscriber.example.org with ESMTP
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=simple/simple; d=lists.example; s=s;
    t=1603974193; bh=sEPYSlJlh90leqy5+63oPn1iU+9P684R92cZHXa9ENw=;
    h=Date:From:To:Subject;
    b=fTSAMcaEatofQCuAeUhlTXmVl5j9bPbwWgc84NWtoSt5zT+SSNp37DTzhYIGHozEk
     bpldArGQ+GygJE1b2witi6NctBd1O/xsUwDcJQxDXkF63QlCcalbKWypHZOhRqncUQ
     zgUzdcuYgqTYMJ0NoTP8fqu0HdgmjD2LJXjV3pVI=
Old-Authentication-Results: lists.example;
  dkim=pass header.d=example.com
Received: from mail.example.com by lists.example with ESMTP
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=simple/simple; d=example.com; s=s;
    t=1603973996; bh=eWqyE53pjRVCFGyHY1zGQTkCEvucN1vNN4cTcWk90WU=;
    h=Date:From:To:Subject;
    b=LGP1M3IX6XORfLs8HRLCFOcymzsPn+8+ljgQlmeNlCC/2Cl1+aBDCIEnzWI0pceCb
     zg32vFfEeryvRDHB1L1K4rrKCEznvO0J3p1xkUPEWpSpzxUGw+PK9KA9ePZ5qdz7cI
     /hXf7zjebznNdDQJnxajf7QHnx1tXmxijsJ1jiGQ=
Old-Authentication-Results: example.com; auth=pass (details omitted)
Original-From: Author <user@example.com>
Received: from mua.example.com by mail.example.com with ESMTPA
Message-ID: <123456@author.example>
Date: Mon, 28 Oct 2020 13:12:55 +0100
From: Author via MLM <MLM@lists.example>
MIME-Version: 1.0
To: MLM@lists.example
Subject: [example] Check simple MLM message
Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary=original-boundary

Original preamble must be preserved!

--original-boundary
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit

This is a plain text message submitted to a mailing list.
The mailing list is expected to add a footer and a subject tag.

Best
Author

--original-boundary
Content-Type: image/png
Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64

iVBORw0KGgoAAAANSUhEUgAAAAYAAAAGCAYAAADgzO9IAAAABHNCSVQICAgIfAhkiAAAAAlwSFlz
AAAHKgAAByoB49HU1wAAABl0RVh0U29mdHdhcmUAd3d3Lmlua3NjYXBlLm9yZ5vuPBoAAAB+SURB
VAiZNcGxDYUgAEXRhxTMYWLFVlDTOAUjOIEzWDqEC1igCQ0LSLi/+ueotUZKieu6uO+bdV2ptaLz
PDHGsG0b+74jieM40Pd91Fr5K6UAMC3LImutxhgaY8g5p3meNcUYFULQ+756nkchBMUYpd47OWe8
93jvyTnTe+cHXqRZbKSV4EoAAAAASUVORK5CYII=

--original-boundary
Content-Tyep: text/plain

________________________________________
this message was modified by MLM example
adding this footer and the subject tag
(note that l= cannot work in this case)

--original-boundary--
]]></sourcecode>
			</section>
			<section anchor="example-wrapped"  numbered="true" toc="default">
				<name>Multipart wrapped</name>
				<t>
	When the original body is multipart/alternative, MLMs have to wrap
	the whole body into the first entity of a multipart/mixed structure.
	Indeed, appending an entity to a multipart/alternative would result
	in it either hiding or being hidden by the existing ones.</t>
				<sourcecode name=""><![CDATA[
Received: from lists.example by subscriber.example.org with ESMTP
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=simple/simple; d=lists.example; s=s;
    t=1603962061; bh=n4/RahgnfVg7htgJtCr7TwEW4eKA1O5oiNaQFA5HU+A=;
    h=Date:From:To:Subject;
    b=RJlq/Fu40AC1hdJfljd+KPU69Vq2M7capbGQyEMhDWvaN7xDPJdXotwnTwiz91iZY
     5W3ITY7YXKHsWweLxu1Rph3ST3bbYQ1cifztpmtu4VPifBkm9MAe7OMDLHhk5ua9YL
     VzJOsXieiIw5a8JhOsr6F/05/K05kNiEXvuLgKd8=
Old-Authentication-Results: lists.example;
  dkim=pass header.d=example.com
Received: from mail.example.com by lists.example with ESMTP
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=simple/simple; d=example.com; s=s;
    t=1603961679; bh=XiCPbOV1vcu2Q2TyEUOuT4SMun2AjYj/Va6KRPa1lv0=;
    h=Date:From:To:Subject;
    b=gvM5grV2dbtinFMLcExv+gMATILzY+c8RY7QPVBJSFohH5HMgOLwrgSH8uwOcZxq0
     FoXtBcHnukonqo97l8nY0faHi0Dp0LAmqn9e4ijwXw9IWwhFuUiCwICRaLEzrNUVBN
     TWtzkQKnHpEXnPGBD7Q9f924mBe+eZsDyRc41ZvQ=
Old-Authentication-Results: example.com; auth=pass (details omitted)
Original-From: Author <user@example.com>
Received: from mua.example.com by mail.example.com with ESMTPA
Message-ID: <123456@author.example>
Date: Mon, 28 Oct 2020 13:12:55 +0100
From: Author via MLM <MLM@lists.example>
MIME-Version: 1.0
To: MLM@lists.example
Subject: [example] Check simple MLM message
Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary=MLM-boundary

This is the MLM preamble, not signed by Author.

--MLM-boundary
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=original-boundary

Original preamble must be preserved!

--original-boundary
Content-Type: text/plain;

This is a plain text message submitted to a mailing list.
The mailing list is expected to add a footer and a subject tag.

Best
Author

--original-boundary
Content-Type: text/html;

<p>This is a plain text message submitted to a mailing list.
The mailing list is expected to add a footer and a subject tag.

<p>Best<br>
Author<br>

--original-boundary--

Original epilogue

--MLM-boundary
Content-Type: text/plain

________________________________________
this message was modified by MLM example
adding this footer and the subject tag
(note that l= is not set)

--MLM-boundary--

MLM epilogue
]]></sourcecode>
			</section>
		</section>
	</back>
</rfc>
